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THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. By H. Lauterpacht.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1933. pp. xxiv, 469.
Just as for John Austin the essence of law was the definite human legislator, so for
Professor Lauterpacht the essence of law is the definite human judge. This thought
is the real core of his work, and it is to be regretted that it was not taken as his
thesis, and advanced and defended as such. It is not until chapter XX, at the very
conclusion of the work, that we get a formal presentation of the proposition; and
then the proofs which the reader is offered are singulary unconvincing. Professor
Lauterpacht regards the absence of a legislature, of judges, and of rigid enforcement
as "defects" in international law, and founds on this pure assumption an argument
against the legal nature of rules which are destitute of all these ornaments. 1710
reveals very eloquently the logical shortcomings of those modern theories according
to which the force of international law rests on the independent will of each state;
but he does not grapple seriously with the theory that international law rests on the
consciousness of binding obligations in state relations which pervades general opinion
throughout the world, and requires no definite, fallible judges to enunciate and
enforce it.
It is not the possibility that international judges may not be impartial that weighs
with nations in declining to accept obligatory arbitration. It is the certainty that
among their number will be found men characterized by pedantry, fussiness, bigotry,
fossilization, arbitrariness, obstinacy, innovating bias, and appetite for jurisdiction.
Securus judical orbis terrarum; but we can not say the same of fifteen honorable and
well meaning gentlemen selected by the chance vote of an unwieldy body, and by
methods from which as Professor Lauterpacht himself observes, "it is by no means
certain" that "undesirable influences" such as haste, chance, physical fatigue and sheer
log-rolling are "entirely eliminated," and by "the dangerous instrument of a majority
vote." That universal and compulsory arbitration would tend to rivet on the world
an unprogressive legalism was pointed out long before the war, and before Westlake.
This reviewer was laying stress upon the point a quarter of a century ago; and no
credit is due for having done so, as it must have been obvious to everybody who
thought about such matters at all.
A practicing lawyer will readily recognize how unsuitable the methods of litigation
are for settling disputes among a coterie of neighbors, or among a family living
together. The nations of the world resemble such a family. Court decisions may
be acceptable as a necessity in a community of thousands, but the limited circle,
whether of neighbors or of states, is impatient of forensic methods. "Only neigh-
borly arrangements, conceived in a spirit of accommodation," to use the author's
own lapidary phrase in speaking of visionary schemes of international legislation,
"can ... provide a satisfactory and lasting solution." But Professor Lauterpacht
formally states that the only choice lies between accepting a system of forensic
decisions and admitting that individual states are the sole judges of their own cause.
He gives no attention to the classic third alternative: the judgment of the world at
large. Indeed he speaks of the idea of restricting the sphere of international law to
matters of little importance and the idea of the limitation of the function of judicial





Professor Lauterpacht was moved to write his stimulating book by a strong
reaction against the current division of disputes into categories "justiciable" and
"non-justiciable." The work eventually took the wider form of an examination into
the whole philosophy of international law; but it still retains the impress of the
original impulse. After an historical sketch of the development of the idea of
"justiciability" the author proceeds to deal with four impugned doctrines: namely,
those which rest the dichotomy in question on (1) the existence of unsettled points
in the law; (2) the major importance of certain matters; (3) the existence of equit-
able considerations; (4) the frank assertion of self interest as overriding law and
equity alike. Each head is treated with infinite learning, often drawn from most
obscure sources with enormous industry and with severe and sustained, if somewhat
formalized, thought. It would take too long to examine the author's positions in
detail; we can only indicate a few salient features. The author has little difficulty
in disposing of the "lacuna" theory, although we can scarcely concur in his convic-
tion that a dispute is properly considered "justiciable" by a court which decides it
by declining to decide it,2 and we may well question the summary verdict that "an
arbitrator who arrives' at the final conclusion that a treaty means nothing has failed
in his duty as a jurist and a judge." The "importance" theory, which the author
regards as that which exercises the greatest influence in practice, raises the whole
question of the suitability of forensic methods to decide the fate of nations. A
curious argument is advanced in this connection.3 All state questions are essentially
political questions; and all political questions are important. Therefore, all state
questions are important and as such ought to be non-justiciable if the doctrine of
"importance" is valid! Surely it is the relative importance of some of these state
questions that is the basis of the doctrine. Under the same head the author advances
several valuable suggestions for improving the constitution and procedure of the
Permanent Court, and discusses with disapproval the existence of "national judges."
The third head, that of cases in which application of the existing law would pro-
duce an inequitable result, raises the question of changes in the law. The author
justly remarks that the need for change is apt to be overestimated, under the influ-
ence of momentary conditions, and that often it is best introduced by judicial meth-
ods of accommodation to modem needs. "The existing legal status quo may be a
source of friction, but there is no certainty that legislation devised to alter it may not
prove even more dangerous to the cause of peace." In this connection Professor
Lauterpacht discusses with marked disapproval the facile application of the doctrine
of rebus sic stantibus, as inimical to all security and stability, and, singularly enough,
with less disapproval the still more dangerous doctrine of abus de droits, according
to which the exercise of a clear right is barred if it can be stigmatized as "unsocial"
or "anti-social," whatever these adjectives may mean. The author adds a chapter
on conciliation; and so devoted is he to judicial settlement that he damns conciliation
with faint praise, as encroaching to some extent on the sacred domain of the judge.
"In so far," he asserts, "as it is in effect used as a pretext for concealing the de-
termination of the states to remain free from the duty of obligatory judicial settle-
ment, it is harmful."
Under the fourth head Professor Lauterpacht deals trenchantly with conflicts of
sheer interest, which are not legal disputes at alL He rightly warns us against ex-
aggerating their importance. For the moment, the unfortunate consequences of the
upheaval of 1914 clothe these conflicts of interest with a fictitious importance. But
the author shows that the consequences of territorial acquisitions are probably of
2. See p. 21.
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minor account compared with economic, and cultural factors and neighborly co-
operation. Further, he writes, "the clash of economic interests need not in itself
-constitute a danger to the cause of peace," in an international society living under
the rule of law. Within the nation economic competition is looked upon as a heathy
and necessary factor in the life of the community; why not in the international
sphere? "It is somewhat disturbing to see economists and statesmen who, in the
domain of economic activity within the state, adopt the view that natural adjust-
ments acting in conformity with the rigid laws of economics do, with inescapable
necessity, punish unsound and merely spiteful economic action, demonstrate alarm
-at unreasonable and eventually self-injurious economic interference on the part of
governments." Such emphasis on alarm at economic nationalism is really against the
interests of peace. 4 Finally the author recommends the dropping of all classifica-
tions of disputes, and the adoption of a system whereby an optional system of con-
ciliation, in the broadest sense, would be available at the outset, with obligatory
recourse to judicial settlement as its sequel, should measures of conciliation fail.
And he adds some weighty remarks on the fallacious hope that all conflicts of interest
and every cause of international friction can be composed "by way of a binding
-settlement imposed by a body of arbitrators." He therefore replaces the dichotomy
of "justiciable" and "non-justiciable" disputes with a new dichotomy between "legal"
and "non-legal" disputes. For the former he would have obligatory courts; the
latter he would leave to Nature. If this should seem a rather mechanical division,
tending to discourage arbitral conciliation for clashes of interest, and to impose too
rigid and unacceptable a formula, it is at any rate a coherent proposition which
readers will appreciate and in which they will find much food for thought, The
author shows very clearly how inexact and unscientific it is to regard arbitration as
generally absolved from considerations of legal right, and he admirably demonstrates
the absurdity of the General Act, drafted at the Ninth Assembly of the Socid d des
Nations, for the settement of international disputes, which provides for the sub-
mission of any dispute which has nothing to do with "rights" to a procedure of con-
ciliation, and if that does not succeed, to an arbitral tribunal which is expressly
prohibited from deciding it! Since the dispute, ex hypothesi, involves no question
of law, and the tribunal is to decide it "by applying existing rules of law," this indeed
appears to be the undeniable result of the General Act.
Part VI is concerned with the limitation of the sphere of law in international and
municipal intercourse, and its principal interest lies in the examination, in chapter
XX, of the basis of the law of nations. The various theories are succinctly ex-
plained: Hobbes' and Lasson's view that international law does not exist; Austin's
and Soml6's view that it exists but is not law; the view of Oppenbeim and Holland
that it is law, but weak law. The theory that it exists as law, and very strong law,
impressed on the minds of individuals, not of states, as a strongly binding obligation,
however originating and however limited in present content, does not seem to have
occurred to him. He proceeds to analyze the bases on which international law is
tested by various schools. Hatschek, Strupp and Hiller place it on a "co-ordinate"
system between states, which practically resolves itself into custom; others such as
Triepel, Cavagliari and Anzilotti, on implied contract; others, as Kauffmann, on force;
Jellinek, on "self-limitation." All these Professor Lauterpacht discards. He shows
that the will of states is not international law, which is something behind and trans-
cending their will. "The first postulated legal cause can fittingly be formulated by
reference to the international community as such, and not to the will of the individual




legal nature of the law of nations that it is sometimes broken. "Absolute certainty,"
he says, "would transform it into a law of natural science."
A book dealing with the hidden roots of law can never be easy reading. As in
the case of Austin, the attempt to give perfectly clear expression to the profound
and elusive ideas which underly our superficial experience is actually inimical to
clarity. It is a tribute to Profesor Lauterpacht's mastery of language that, although
dose attention is required from the reader, that attention will seldom, if ever, be
misspent. There can be no question of the immense value of his work-of its exact
and profound scholarship, its clear impartiality, and its stimulating analysis.
Tokio, Japan. TiromAs BATY.t
CASES AND MATERIALS ON Cp, INAL LAW AND PRocnunm. By Albert J. Hamo.
Chicago: Callaghan and Company. 1933. pp. Iviii, 952.
CASES ON CRImAL LAw. Third Edition. By William E. Mikell. St. Paul: West
Publishing Co. 1933. pp. xxiii, 775.
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIrm AL LAW. By Henry Weihofen. New York:
The Commonwealth Fund. (1933.) pp. :i, 524.
DUPING the past twenty years the people of the United States have become
increasingly "crime-consdous." Perhaps this has been because of the multiplying
variety of crimes which have developed out of the rapidy changing panorama of
present day human life; perhaps because of the dramatic quality which the press
has given to such crimes; perhaps because of crime commissions, crime surveys,
model codes, national prohibition, the World War, motion pictures, the depression.
In any event serious questions are being asked as to causes and cures for crime
and as to the responsibility of this group and the capacity of that one to administer
the criminal law. All this new interest and activity has ruffled, slightly, the serenity
even of the quiet waters of law school curricula and teaching.
Recently a report of a joint committee representing the Association of American
Law Schools, the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association stated
in part:
"We believe that the law schools should undertake the teaching of criminal law
and procedure. In view of the unsatisfactory conditions of criminal justice in this
country and the responsibility of lawyers for improvement we believe it important
that the schools inform their students as to the factors which contribute to present
conditions as well as the lines along which there may be improvement. How this
should be accomplished, as by giving in one course a picture of modem conditions
and ideas, or by special instructions along several distinct lines, or in other ways,
is, of course, for the schools to determine. . . . A law school which seeks merely
to give a knowledge of law as it is fails to perform an important function. In
teaching criminal law and procedure the object should be, not only to familiarize
the student with the existing law and practice, but also to arouse his interest in
remolding the law to meet modem conditions and in improving methods of
practice."
Without attempting to sketch the present condition of law school teaching of
criminal law, it may be said that in a number of law schools new courses, or
course changes, have appeared in curricula, suggesting an effort to meet the
challenge. In many, the old limitations still persist. It is interesting, in the light
tBritish Foreign Office, Tokio.
1934]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of these circumstances, to inquire what is being done in the preparation of teaching
materials. Two new casebooks, one by William E. Mikell of the University of
Pennsylvania and one by Albert J. Harno of the University of Illinois, together
-with a study of insanity by Henry Weihofen, made under the auspices of the
University of Chicago Law School, provide a basis for such an inquiry.
Mr. Mikell's book, as is true of the earlier editions thereof, is designed for the
orthodox course in substantive criminal law without much attempt to challenge
interest in such problems as the social background of criminal law, and present
day problems of administration. For instance, although in practically every state
there has grown up, during the last thirty-five years, a juvenile court law which
has in large measure rendered obsolete the common law of "Infancy"; the latest
case in this casebook upon the subject is seventy-six years old, and a one hundred
per cent. exposure to the book would leave the student entirely unaware of the
new development. Similarly, as regards insanity, only the most meager note cita-
tions serve to acquaint the student with the extensive literature on insanity, the
work of modem psychologists and the use of psychiatric clinics.
The author states in his preface that twenty-six new cases have been added.
One of these1 happily reveals an enforcement device, entrapment, the use of which
has grown surprisingly during recent years. Generally speaking, however, the new
cases carry out old ideas of casebook planning and the only really new feature
of the book is rearrangement of material; important examples of this are found
in the placing of the chapters on specific offenses ahead of the chapters on defenses
and parties; placing "Attempts" and "Conspiracy" with the specific offenses instead
of in the chapter on "Act"; and placing the cases on "Negligence," formerly grouped
with the cases on "Intent," in the chapter on manslaughter.
The writer has used Mikell's "Cases" for a number of years, and is still using
them for the teaching of that part of his course on criminal law and its administra-
tion which deals with the substantive law. Moreover, he has found them admirably
adapted for teaching purposes. Mr. Mikell is not particularly concerned with
problems of judges and prosecutors and is quite willing to let others struggle with
administrative devices. This is a frank and a proper approach, but it is not a
complete approach and the teaching of criminal law upon this limited basis, while
highly important in itself, will not go far toward the improvement of present day
conditions of criminal justice.
Mr. Harno's casebook evidences a very definite purpose to make available for
teaching purposes a much wider selection of teaching materials, including generous
excerpts from law texts, and legal periodicals, several selections from non-legal
texts and periodicals, and a wealth of note citations and quotations. To a very
considerable extent he has used recent cases. For example, considerably more than
one third of his cases have been decided since 1910. Generally speaking, this
material has been woven into the more or less orthodox skeleton of a substantive
law course. A valuable collection of material, well designed for purposes of orient-
ing the student in the philosophy of criminal law, is hidden under a chapter title
"General Considerations" and a section title "Introductory." The only section title
in the table of contents which would occasion any surprise to a lawyer of one
hundred years or more ago, is the one entitled "The 'Fence'," in the chapter on
receiving stolen property. On the other hand, to use the same example as was
used in connection with Mikell's "Cases," in his chapter on "Infancy," Mr. Harno
uses two short cases to set forth the common law; then an excerpt from a mono.
graph which deplores the incarceration of delinquent children in places of adult
1. Sorrels v. United States, 287 U. S. 436 (1932).
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detention and describes briefly the beginning of the juvenile court in 1899; and
finally two modem cases, covering twelve pages, developing the law relating to the
juvenile court.
Another good example of Air. Harno's method of treatment is his collection of
material on insanity. Here we find M'Naghten's case and some of the other well
known cases which developed the right and wrong doctrine and the irresistible
impulse test of insanity. But in addition he has an excerpt from Ferri on "Crimina
Sociology," an excerpt from Mercier on "Criminal Responsibility," a selection from
Gueck, "Psychiatry and the Criminal Law," a selection from Singer, "Illinois
Crime Survey," and generous note reference to other text and periodical material.
On the other hand, even in this particular, Mr. Harno reveals an adherence to old
forms. His material on insanity is found along with drunkenness, self defense
and several other such subjects, as one of the sections in the chapter on homicide,
thus sacrificing for ease of presentation an element of essential realism which the
student must face as a lawyer. Why should insanity be urged only as a defense
for criminal homicide? We may suspect that the teaching of criminal law in the
past may have contributed to an attitude which seems to assume that it should
be so limited. The use of the psychiatric clinic suggests an entirely different
approach. The great probability is that it should be extended to include even
the minor offenses, and that the hope of the future, through methods of prevention
and individualization of treatment, is to be found in an entirely different approach.
That it is necessary for a student to shift from one concept of substantive criminal
law to another is hardly sufficient to warrant closing his mind to the fact that
mental disturbances may contribute to many forms of criminal conduct, and to
the fact that the law should be equally concerned with directing preventive pro-
cedures as with following along after the commission of crimes and giving con-
sideration to mental inadequacy only in homicide cases.
Nearly two hundred pages of Mr. Hamo's book are devoted to a chapter on
criminal procedure. Here again we find a generous sprinkling of new material,
both legal and non-legal in character, including extensive citations from the American
Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure and from such sources as the report
of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.
The author's effort to provide material which will be up-to-date and reveal present
day conditions is well illustrated also in his section entitled "Probation, Pardon
and Parole"; the oldest of the three cases which he uses was decided in 1914;
and the balance of the section is devoted to a four page excerpt from one of the
reports of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.
It is probable that the material which is contained in Mr. M fikell's casebook
is more than sufficient to occupy the time which is allowed in many law schools
for teaching the subject of criminal aw. It is no doubt true that the much richer
collection of material contained in Mr. Harno's book is more than sufficient for
the same purpose. When we refer back, however, to the recommendations of the
Joint Committee, it is easy to see that the material of neither casebook is by any
means adequate to accomplish the purpose suggested in that report. Obviously,
it is necessary that further concurrent steps be taken, first, to enlarge the time
available in the law school curriculum for teaching criminal law and, secondly,
to continue to improve teaching material.
Air. Weihofen's book is obviously not intended as a casebook or even as a
textbook for the teaching of criminal law. It is, however, a valuable example of
the type of material which may be used to supplement casebook or textbook material
used in a course in criminal law, planned along the lines indicated in the report
of the joint committee. This book is a careful study, from the lawyer's point of
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view, of the insanity defense. Introductory paragraphs are devoted to consideration
of the question, "What is wrong with the law?", of legal and psychiatric terminology,
and of the purpose and plan of the book. Thereafter consideration is given to
summarizing the legal tests of irresponsibility, tracing the historical developments
of the various tests used in America, and tracing present trends in the law. A
chapter is devoted to the subject of the burden of proof of insanity; another to
the use of expert and non-expert testimony; a third to the disposition and treatment
of defendants who are found insane, and the use which is made of the defense
of insanity at various stages of the proceedings. In a chapter which summarizes
suggested reforms, consideration is given to the development of psychiatric clinics,
attempts to revise the various tests of insanity, and the desirability of substituting
a concept of treatment for generally prevailing concepts of punishment. Each
chapter carries with it an elaborate digest of statutes and cases, arranged alphabet.
ically by states. There is also a twenty page bibliography of legal and non-legal
material, and the usual tables of cases and statutes.
Although it is too much to expect that many students will have time or inclination
to read such elaborate supplementation of casebook material, it is nevertheless to
be hoped that more such monographs may become available for purposes of citation
and collateral reading. In fact, we may very well admit that only in this way
can we hope to make any considerable extension of the scope of our courses in
criminal law, or improve the background of those members of the bar upon whom
we must depend "in remolding the law to meet modem conditions, and In improving
methods of practice."
Durham, North Carolina. JUSTIN MILIPR,j'
CIVILIZATION OF THE OLD NORTHWEST. By Beverley Waugh Bond. New York.:
Macmillan. 1934. pp. ix, 543.
A GENERAL history which includes the development of civil and criminal law among
the particular people dealt with is not a common sort of book in America. Our
shelves are loaded with accounts of the course of political and constitutional ideas.
European writers have written much of the origin, reception and remolding of their
own national legal systems. However, this volume on the cradle period of the Old
Northwest, that is to say, the area now known as Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois
and Wisconsin, from its first political organization under federal auspices in 1787
to the War of 1812, contains much legal history, in the true sense. It offers us
accounts of the origins of the statutes first adopted, the evolution of the courts and
the legal machinery, and the influence of men and their former homesites on the
modem law of the states mentioned.
The states of the Union fall into fairly defined groups or schools so far as concerns
the form and tone of their earlier legislation and sets of legal concepts. Thus a
Virginia school of states can be traced from the Old Dominion over the Cumberland
Mountains, along the southern bank of the Ohio River, across the Mississippi and
to the foot of the Rocky Mountains. Suffering a prairie change, the laws of Virginia
form the basis of many statutes and of the thought of most of the lawyers from
Virginia through West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, and even Illinois
and Tennessee to Colorado. On the Pacific side of the continent, several main
topics of Field's Codes, with some Spanish intermixture, can be traced from Cal-
tDean of the School of Law, Duke University.
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fornia, through to Idaho, Montana and the Dakotas. There are other less wide-
flung areas of inheritance. Only recently have these well defined family groups
become blurred by an indiscriminate intermarriage of legal ideas among the states.
The Old Northwest borrowed its laws from New England, from the Middle States
like New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and from Virginia. The transplanting process
can be followed in lively fashion. This is done in the book before us by the author,
who is a professor of history in the University of Cincinnati, as he traces a mass
of other information about social, educational, cultural and religious institutions
brought into the grasslands and woodlands of the wilderness by the frontiersmen
after the Revolution. There is much sketching here for our still unpainted galleries
of American legal history. So far there are few such convasses even stretched,
only a handful finished and hardly market for any at all. This book's incidental
contribution is therefore most important.
The writer's aim is to sort, arrange, and to some extent comment upon and
estimate the meaning of a mass of details covering fifteen years of newspaper files,
magazine articles and official records. The printed matter he has digested is impres-
sive. Frontier newspapers, New England and Southern magazines, almanacs, con-
gressional debates and reports are his principal raw materials. Some of his
interpretations will arouse criticism, but the ground work is laid out in convincing
style.
The story begins with the Land Ordinance of 1785 which provided a scheme
for disposing of the vast areas of the Northwest on the New England plan of
government townships, to be sold or given away freely to actual settlers. This
plan was a new venture, a departure from the practice of colonizing by grants to
companies of speculators which England had followed for two centuries and would
no doubt have followed in the Great Lakes area if she had retained her claims to
sovereignty. The consequences were significant. The opportunities attracted a
stream of men and families with scant means and many democratic sentiments.
They brought the ideals and ways of life that fitted their circumstances. The
famous Ordinance of 1787 promised these settlers territoryship and statehood as
soon as their numbers increased under the first regime of simple, concentrated
paternalism. The area offered to them lay roughly between the Ohio River, the
Mississippi and the Great Lakes. In it lived, in 1785, perhaps forty-five thousand
Indians, five thousand French and only a sprinkling of English speaking trappers
and traders. Into it now moved group after group of settlers, some from New
England into what has become Eastern Ohio, some from New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania into Southeastern and Southern Ohio and Indiana, some from Virginia or
of Virginian strains into Southern Indiana and Illinois. Each group brought its
own ideas of politics and law.
After outlining generally the plan for settlement and utimate self-government,
in a chapter called "The Basis for Civilization," and the yearnings and vicissitudes
of the immigrants, in "The Lure of the Western Lands," the author sketches the
story of the first efforts at law and order under the authority of a governor and
three judges. Then follow chapters tracing the rapid rise of Ohio, Indiana, Ilinois
and Michigan as organisms separate from the mother territory. The latter half
of the book takes up the course of the struggle with the Indians, with land n-oblems,
agriculture, trade, culture, religion and public order as separate general topics.
The Ordinance of 1787 granted the power to make and execute laws to four
persons, a governor who materialized as an educated Scotchman named St. Clair,
and three legislator-judges. The Ordinance authorized this body to adopt for the
new territory laws taken from the original states. Only the code of Pennsylvania
was easily available when the officials met at Marietta, Ohio. Their first legislation
1934]
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was, as might be expected, set on a base of Pennsylvania jurisprudence with New
England amendments. The criminal sections, for example, were full of puritanical
ideas. Seven years later, after disputes over the propriety of the original and some
intervening legislation, a new general series of statutes was adopted. This code
was called, after its printer, Maxwell's Code. It became an important landmark.
Based again chiefly on Pennsylvania law, as represented by twenty-five statutes,
the Maxwell Code borrowed one law from New Jersey, six from Massachusetts,
three from Virginia, one and part of another from New York. The evident influence
of individuals in this result is interesting. Four years later a new and locally
chosen legislative body remolded the statutes on the old base into the revision of
1799 which became the parent of the subsequent state systems for Ohio, Indiana
and Illinois.
The next year Indiana Territory was set off leaving only Ohio and part of
Michigan in the old Northwest Territory. Indiana Territory, which included all
of modem Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin, with parts of Michigan and Minnesota,
was being largely settled by Virginians and Kentuckyians. It was governed by
William Henry Harrison, who came of the same stock. Its first separate legislation
was taken almost exclusively from Old Dominion sources, some parts coming through
Kentucky. Thus to the material of the Maxwell Code was added this southern
flavor. A blend of Pennsylvania and Virginia ideas, faintly stiffened with those of
New England, was the result which was recompiled in 1807. This compilation
became the outline of future law for both Indiana and Illinois.
Meantime Ohio had become a state, had based its constitution on that of Ten-
nessee and after a year or two had set up a code which was as conglomerate in its
makeup as the Ohio population. This population was chiefly drawn from New
England, Pennsylvania and Virginia. Illinois, where southerners prevailed, soon
overlaid the skeleton of the Maxwell Code with further contributions chiefly from
Kentucky. Michigan set off as a territory in 1805, spent some years in a famous
dispute over two rival statutory systems, one named for Judge Woodward and
the other Judge Witherell, both systems of hybrid ancestry. The former finally
prevailed.
The whole history is a lesson on the influence of both individuals and groups in
impressing upon a new community the legal traditions of their former homes;
moreover, the effect of frontier conditions on old institutions is plainly set forth
for study. The book is a warehouse of facts for the fourteen years of migration
and struggle for law and order which it covers. No reader not concerned with
serious history or local curiosity is likely to peruse the book for idler purposes,
The stage is too crowded with personalities, the scenery too large, the detail too
multifarious. There is, however, some little pageantry or drama here and there
for the average reader, and the student who is curious about legal and governmental
processes of a frontier will find much to feed upon. The lawyer can count the
book a contribution to American legal history. It is a stout task, thoroughly and
presentably accomplished. The addition of maps might have been helpful.
Boulder, Colorado. JAWES GRAFTON ROGERS.f
tDean of the School of Law, University of Colorado.
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LYNCHI AND THE LAw. By James Harmon Chadbourn. 1933. Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press. pp. xi, 221.
THE TRAGEDY or LYNCHING. By Arthur Franklin Raper. 1933. Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press. pp. viii, 499.
THouGi these two volumes, prepared under the auspices of the Southern Com-
mission on the Study of Lynching, appeared some time ago, their vitality has not
diminished since the date of publication. Nothing has been done to bring us nearer
to a solution of the problem with which they deal. On the contrary, in November,
1933, Governor Rolph openly approved the lynching of two white men in Cali-
fornia; since that time twenty-one men have lost their lives at the hands of mobs
and the Wagner-Costigan bill" has died on the Senate calendar.
Dr. Raper's book is a report of what an able investigator was able to discover
about the lynching, in 1930, of twenty negroes and one foreign-bom white. The
active lynchers were for the most part, though not exclusively, drawn from the
younger members of the non-tax-paying portion of the community. The com-
munity itself was in each case below the economic average in the state, though in
three cases the situs was a town from fifteen to twenty-five thousand in population.
The towns themselves were characterized by the usual exploitation of negro labor,
the political impotence of the negro population, and the unequal allocation for
negroes and whites of public funds devoted to educational purposes. In every case
the local officials were either grossly negligent or in open connivance with the mob;
in every case the "good people" of the South remained inactive in the face of the
threat of mob violence. After the event, there were apologists for the lynching in
all walks of life; the rural newspapers carefully refrained from unseemly denuncia-
tion and even in the large cities the criticisms of the press diminished in wigor the
nearer the scene of the violence it happened to be.
In fifteen of the twenty-one cases studied, no indictments followed; in six, a total
of forty-nine persons were indicted, and four convicted, two of arson and rioting
and two of murder. The latter alone received severe sentences, but this is a good
record since, as Professor Chadbourn tells us, only eight-tenths of one per cent.
of the lynchings since 1900 have resulted in convictions. The failure of the law-
enforcement machinery was the product of wilful breach of duty by officials and
jurors, as well as widespread perjury by members of the community. Moreover,
in only one case was strenuous disciplinary action undertaken against the derelict
law officers. In that case the sheriff and circuit solicitor resigned under fire, but
the latter was duly returned to office at the next election, and the State Law En-
forcement Department, which conducted the investigation, was abolished by the next
governor as a measure of "economy."
Lynching is not only an evil; it is a symptom of many evils and most of the evils
of which it is symptomatic it helps to perpetuate. That it caused the death of only
a few men in 1930 is relatively insignificant. Were that all, there would be some
warrant for Dean Kirchwey's remarks that the "'menace' of lynching . . . has
obviously become an insignificant and vanishing element in an enormous homicide
and general crime rate."'2  But the lynching in 1930 was, as Dr. Raper shows, the
occasion and, to some extent no doubt, a cause of the brutalization of the thousands
of participants, active and passive, of the corruption of the more numerous apolo-
gists, and of the official abandonment of the entire legal machine. It was a cause
of the further terrorization of the negro population, a terror which differs from the
common fear of crime, in that the latter, with certain exceptions in the case of coam-
1. S. 1978, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934).
2. Book Review (1934) 34 COL. L. R-v. 978, 980.
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mercial racketeering, leads to no self-abasement by the fearful. But the negro who
succumbs to his terror must acquiesce in all the other injustices perpetrated on his
race, a result which should be abhorrent to the dominant citizens of a civilized
state. Whether he succumbs or not, it is difficult to call him unreasonable if he
embraces the conviction, shared by many of his fellows,8 that his road to justice
reaches beyond existing governmental institutions. That point of view is not
refuted by more terror, as in Tuscaloosa,4 or even by the invocation of legal
sanctions against radical organizers, as in the Herndon case in Georgia and many
others. It can be dispelled only by the creation of a more abundant life for the
negro and for the "voteless, propertyless, unattached whites" who, Dr. Raper tells
us, constitute over half of the southern white population; to make possible such a
life is the job of government.
Believing that significant reconstruction must be the work of generations, the
Southern Commission asked whether under existing conditions it "was not possible
that the processes of the law in dealing with lynchings could be quickened and given
life." Professor Chadbourn's book is the answer. He surveys the legal devices now
on the books and others analogous to them, concluding rightly enough that the legal
sanctions can be strengthened, the better to serve the ends of repression and pre-
vention. Special jury panels can be used, information substituted for indictment,
and the control of prosecution shifted from the local community to the Attorney-
General. An air-tight pecuniary penalty can be imposed on lynching counties, de-
linquent peace officers made more amenable to ouster, the use of militia and change
of venue facilitated and courts of equity empowered to enjoin threatened action.
Removal of prisoners immediately upon arrest can be rendered compulsory, but Pro-
fessor Chadbourn concludes that the fate of such a bill in North Carolina in 1931 is a
clear indication of the reaction of the southern legislator to the expense involved
in an automatic removal in every case. The other proposals he embodies in an ex-
cellently drafted model statute. Whether the enactment of the statute is likely to
3. See the interesting testimony of Dean Charles H. Houston, of Howard University
Law School at the Senate hearings on the Wagner-Costigan bill. Hearings Before Sub.
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1978, 73d Cong., 2d Sesa (1934) 83, 85.
After calling attention to some of the effects of lynching on the international reputation
and effectiveness of the nation, he continued: " . . . the negro is sick and tired of being
lynched and generally mistreated in spite of his hitherto unwavering loyalty to this country.
Perhaps you have not thought about this. But foreign nations have, and there is not a
single foreign nation which envisions the possibility of war with the United States that
does not gamble on the possibility of negro defection...
"I am not trying to raise a bogey or scare anybody. Personally I realize that our salva-
tion lies in sharing the hazards of the national life. But I think you and the country
both should know that there is grave disillusionment and deep distrust among large ele-
ments of the negro population, especially in the South... And the time may come In an
international crisis when the loyalty or disloyalty of one tenth of the population may spell
the difference between national success and national disaster...
"Why? Because the South will be afraid for the country to arm negroes in any large
numbers....
"And the South will be likewise afraid to go off to fight with a discontented negro
population left at home. .. "
4. See the brief requesting federal action under 35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §
52 (1926), flied with Attorney General Cummings by Leon A. Ransom, Charles H. Houston
and Edward P. Lovett. It was issued in pamphlet form by the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People in November, 1933.
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prove effective without a change in the character of the persons administering it, is, of
course, conjectural. Far more hopeful, as a repressive measure, is the Wagner-
Costigan bill. Professor Chadbourm perceives no way "to estimate the probable
efficacy of federal legislation." But the imposition of responsibility on the federal
attorney, answerable to Washington, and the federal courts, with their national tradi-
tion, judges enjoying life tenure, and jurors drawn from a higher economic and
social stratum, auger well for a federal statute, which in any event is to supplement
and not to be substituted for state legislation. Indeed, it is difficult to understand
the wholesale opposition to the bill by southern lawyers and judges, to which Chad-
bourn calls our attention, except on the hypothesis that many people believe it may
be effective. Those who regard the whole matter as local and unfit for federal action
should reread the fourteenth amendment. And those who fear that federalism may
lose too much by thus asserting itself may well consider whether a federalLn worth
preserving must not be able to stand the loss.
To an informed judgment on the manifold phases of the lynching problem, the
two volumes under consideration make an important contribution.
New York City. HERBERT WECHSLEr f
CoURTs AND THE PUBLIC ScHooLs. By Newton Edwards. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. 1933. pp. xvi, 591.
Tnrs book, while intended primarily as a contribution to social science, is, with
certain limitations, a fairly comprehensive treatise on school law. The book has
failed of completeness as a legal treatise on a very broad subject because the author
has almost entirely confined himself to a consideration of cases involving public
schools, their organization and administration, and has neglected the many valuable
analogies to be found in cases dealing with public employees generally, with civil
service and other phases of municipal administration. Recourse to these sources
would have avoided the not infrequent statement that "there are no decided cases
on" or "there is but little authority upon" this or that question. Apparently what
the author has done has been to collect industriously and to analyze intelligently
all the "school cases" to be found in the published reports of courts of last resort.
The material thus afforded is enormous. The logical arrangement of it into a usable
work was obviously a huge task, but it has been done splendidly, very much better,
indeed, than in the ordinary law "case" or "text" book.
The author (who the writer understands is not a member of the bar) in preface
states the twofold purpose of the book to be "to make clear the fundamental
principles underlying the relation of the State to education" and "to reduce to
systematic organization the principles of the case or of common law which are
applicable to practical problems of school organization and administration." The
author further states by way of preface that "in order to deal intelligently
with many of the aspects of school administration, boards of education, super-
intendents and principals should be familiar with the principles of law which govern
their action."
The work contains a great deal of information, stated simply, concerning school
district organization and functioning, the obligations of school officers, restrictions
upon their direct and indirect participation in contracts made with their school
districts, and their personal liability for their acts which exceed official authority.
, Assistant Professor of Law, Columbia University, School of Law.
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The writer of this review may have become cynical as the result of many years
of more or less intimate contact with public school administration in a great
metropolis. He recognizes as definitely as does the author the necessity of famil-
iarity by members of boards of education, superintendents and principals with the
legal aspects of school administration if they are to serve their constituencies
intelligently and effectively. Nevertheless, having some practical knowledge of
how board members and even superintendents in our large cities are chosen, and
the conditions these officials work under, both as concerns their freedom of action
and their dependence for legal advice upon constituted legal authority not of their
own selection, this reviewer confesses to a feeling of pessimism that the book will
find any considerable circulation within the one group where its circulation is most
needed, and where under non-political conditions it would be most beneficial.
As suggested, the scope of the work is broad. It embraces the relation of tle
school to the state, school district organization and control, the authority, liabilities,
and required procedure of school boards and school officers, taxation for public
educational purposes, debt limitations, acquisition and use of school property,
employment and dismissal of teachers, teachers' pensions, school attendance and
school discipline.
The chapter on the relation of the public school to the state furnishes ready
answers to the many questions arising because of the direct or indirect connection
of the school authority with municipal corporations operating within the same
territory. The problems of district organization and procedure are exhaustively
treated. The chapters on "Contractual Authority and Liability of School Boards,"
"Acquisition and Use of School Property" and "The Contractor's Bond" present
the law suggested by these heads with greater clarity and detail than do the law
digests or encyclopedias. The student interested in the legal aspects of school
administration will be instructed by this book; the lawyer dealing with the problems
of school law will find it an invaluable aid.
The writer experiences a feeling of disappointment at not being able to terminate
his review at this point and refrain from criticism of what, on the whole, is an
excellent and worth-while piece of work. However, it seems to him that certain
observations and conclusions in the first chapter should not go unchallenged. The
author in his first chapter, "The School and the State," reviews Nebraska District,
etc. v. McKelvie,1 wherein the Supreme Court of Nabraska upheld an act of the
Nebraska legislature making unlawful the teaching of foreign languages in public
and private schools, and Meyer v. State of Nebraska,2 in which the Supreme Court
of the United States reversed the Nebraska court, and held the act unconstitutional
as "an arbitrary interference with the liberty of parents to control the education
of their children and with the liberty of modem language teachers to pursue their
lawful calling."
The author then proceeds: "The significance of the Nebraska case will be more
fully appreciated when it is recalled that ten other states had in force substantially
the same kind of legislation as had Nebraska and that in two other states the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such legislation. In a single decision,
therefore, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed an important educational
policy of approximately one-fourth of the states of the Union." It is undoubtedly
the author's resentment toward the Supreme Court's decision in this case that
leads him, after an intermediate reference to Pierce v. Society of Sisters3 (where
1. 104 Neb. 93, 175 N. W. 531 (1919).
2. 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
3. 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
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the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an act of the Oregon
legislature, the effect of which was to entirely prohibit private elementary schools),
to declare: "Since the terms 'liberty,' 'property' and 'due process of law' mean
in any particular case whatever the court may decide that they mean, the court in
reality declares unconstitutional any law of which it disapproves." These decisions
form the premise for the author's final comment, which is not altogether without
the suggestion of his approval, concerning proposals "to amend the Constitution
in such manner as to limit the authority of the court to declare legislation uncon-
stitutional." This reviewer submits that a much broader premise is necessary to
afford a basis either for the author's criticisms of the Supreme Court or the sug-
gestion of a constitutional amendment to limit existing judicial authority.
Chicago, Illinois. Fnk cxs X. BuscH.t
CASES ON RIGHTS n LAND. Second Edition. By Harry A. Bigelow and Joseph
Warren Madden. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1934. pp. xi, 95, xix, 813.
THis new edition of an excellent and popular casebook exhibits the good work-
manship expected of such sound scholars and skillful teachers as are its authors.
The admirable Introduction to the Law of Real Property, which the book contains,
has been somewhat expanded, but it still remains, in the uncompromising rigor of
its condensation, tough reading for young lawyers not yet enured to the hardships
of medieval juristic thinking.
The main body of the work remains substantially unchanged both in analysis and
arrangement. Some of the cases printed in the first edition have been discarded,
but the great landmarks so dear to the hearts of all teachers have been retained,
and many additional cases, mostly of recent decision, have been included in the
collection. These new cases have been skillfully selected, most of them presenting
issues of marked interest and strikingly exemplifying the effects produced when
ancient rules of property law impinge upon modem problems growing out of changed
social and business conditions. Extracts from the American Law Institute's Re-
statements of Torts and Property are also used with excellent effect. Citations of
pertinent periodical literature, while by no means exhaustive, are helpful and
adequate.
As already intimated, the revision, however excellent, is not ambitious or exciting.
The same indeterminate title, "Rights in Land," derived from Professor Gray's even
more inaccurate "Rights in the Land of Another," is retained, despite the obvious
fact that it would be equally descriptive of the whole or any part of the immense
field of real property law. Under this scrap basket title, punctiliously following
the first edition, as that, in turn, followed the second volume of Grays monumental
collection, the authors have assembled all the topics relating to property law that
seemed not readily to find a home anywhere else in the series of property books.
The basic conception underlying the second volume of Gray's collection was non-
possessory or incorporeal rights in land, as interpreted by Blackstone, including
those created by real covenants, which the great commentator barely mentioned.
But the author of the first edition of the present work, fully realizing that the
interests treated by Gray under the heading "Natural Rights" are essentially pos-
sessory, and not incorporeal, introduced into his classification a Part I dealing with
those rather elusive possessory interests, while such non-possessory interests as were
tMember of the Chicago Bar, Dean Emeritus of De Paul University College of Law,
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